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DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association being 
also Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the work performed by defendant/third-party 
plaintiff/appellant, Jack C. Daniels, on the job site on December 
1, 1981, sufficient to establish that day as defendant's last day 
of work from which the time for filing lien begins to run? 
2. If the foregoing issue is resolved in favor of the 
appellant, that will be determinative of the case; however, if it 
is resolved in favor of respondent, then the following issue still 
remains: Where mortgagor (trustor of trust deed) is estopped, 
through its conduct, from raising the defense that the mechanics 
lien was not timely filed, is subsequent mortgagee (beneficiary of 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 86-0466 
trust deed) who acquires its interest in the property from said 
mortgagor, and subsequent to recording of Notice of Lien, likewise 
estopped to assert such defense? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by plaintiff, CEN Corporation, 
against Daniels and certain other defendants on or about February 
25, 1982, by filing of Complaint whereby plaintiff sought to 
cancel of record a mechanics lien filed by defendant/third-party 
plaintiff/appellant, Jack C. Daniels (hereinafter referred to as 
"Daniels"), together with certain other relief not relevant to 
this appeal (R.l-8). Defendant Daniels filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim (R.35-37) seeking foreclosure of the said mechanics 
lien, and thereafter filed an Amendment to Answer and Counter-
claim (R.84-85). Daniels was thereafter granted leave to further 
amend and filed an Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Third-party 
Complaint (R.144-152) adopting his original Answer and 
Counterclaim, the aforesaid Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim 
and asserting a third-party claim against Deseret Federal Savings 
& Loan Association and certain others, all of whom who asserted 
claims to the property, whereby Daniels sought to likewise have 
the mechanics lien foreclosed as against the interests of said 
parties. 
Defendant, Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association 
(hereinafter referred to as "Deseret"), filed a Motion to Dismiss 
(R.160-161) for alleged failure of Daniels to state a claim 
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against it (in the Third-Party Complaint) upon which relief could 
be granted. The said Motion to Dismiss was briefed and orally 
argued to the Court, and the lower Court rendered a Memorandum 
Decision (R.233-240) granting the Motion to Dismiss and thereafter 
entered an instrument entitled "Summary Judgment," (R.243-245) 
whereby the Court ruled: 
" . . . the Motion to Dismiss of Third-Party Defendant, 
Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Association, be and the 
same hereby is granted and judgment is rendered in its 
favor and against Third-Party Plaintiff, Jack C. 
Daniels, no cause of action." 
That judgment was entered on April 26, 1984. 
Thereafter, Daniels filed a Motion to Alter or Amend 
Summary Judgment (R.248-250), the same having been timely served 
on April 4, 1984. That motion was argued to the Court on June 4, 
1984, at which time the Court denied said motion. Daniels asked 
the lower court to certify the said Summary Judgment as a final 
judgment, but the Court denied that request and the Minute Entry 
reflects as follows: 
"Mr. Madsen asks for final order of !no cause of action1 
re Rule 54(b). Court denies same indicating Supreme 
Court is to determine what is appealable." (R.257) 
Written Order Denying Motion to Alter and Amend was 
entered by the Court on June 18, 1984. (R.259-60) Accordingly, 
Daniels filed Notice^of Appeal (R.267-269) to this Court on July 
16, 1984. Thereafter, appellant Daniels filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition, and the respondent Deseret made a Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal on the grounds that the said Summary Judgment was 
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not final. This Court dismissed the appeal as being premature by 
order suggesting therein that the lower court judge reconsider the 
matter in the light of recent decision of this Court. See Pate v. 
Marathon Steel, 692 P2d 765 (Utah 1984). 
The lower court, Judge Billings presiding, has now 
certified the Summary Judgment as being final by Order entered on 
or about the 18th day of August, 1986, (R.281-282) and thereafter 
Daniels filed Notice of Appeal on September 17, 1986, as Case No. 
86-0466 (R.284-286). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 3, 1982, the defendant/third-party 
plaintiff, Jack C. Daniels, filed and recorded a Notice of Lien 
(copy of which is included in the Addendum hereto) in the office 
of the Summit County Recorder, claiming $80,253 owing to him as 
general contractor for construction of an eight-plex condominium 
upon said tract and further claiming that the first work was 
performed on August 26, 1980, and the last work on December 1, 
1981 (R.73-74). 
Daniels completed the work on the eight-plex in the 
summer of 1981, and normally his mechanics lien should have been 
filed within 100 days thereafter. However, the owner, who was 
trying to obtain refinancing, before expiration of said 100-day 
period requested that Daniels not lien the property and 
represented that if he would refrain from doing so, he would be 
paid in two weeks. In reliance thereon Daniels did not lien the 
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property within the normal 100 days provided by the Utah lien law 
(R.64-68, 136, 174). These facts give rise to Daniels Point II 
regarding estoppel. 
Thereafter, on or about December 1, 1981, the pipes in 
the eight-plex froze. The owner called Daniels. The owner 
claimed that Daniels had not properly completed the job, thus 
resulting in said frozen pipes, and requested that he return to 
the job site. Accordingly Daniels returned on December 1, 1981, 
to seek the cause and extent of damage, which he did, and while 
there made estimates of cost, called subcontractors and made 
inquiries regarding insurance (R.65-68, 73, 173, 181-184). 
The trust deeds (under which third-party defendant, 
Deseret, claims) were executed on February 22, 1982, and the said 
instruments were recorded on March 1, 1982, almost one month after 
recording of the Notice of Lien of Daniels. (R.150) 
The instant action was commenced by CEN Corporation 
against Daniels and certain other defendants on or about February 
25, 1982, whereby said plaintiff sought to cancel of record the 
mechanics lien filed by Daniels, together with certain other 
relief. (R.l-8) as noted. Defendant Daniels filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim asking the court to adjudge the validity of said 
mechanic's lien and for foreclosure thereof. (R.35-37) 
In said Answer and Counterclaim Daniels asserted that 
his mechanics lien was timely filed and valid in all respects. In 
that connection it was the contention of Daniels that he as a 
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general contractor had done sufficient work in December so that 
the filing date on February 3f 1982, was timely. In addition 
defendant asserted another ground which counsel felt was 
sufficiently set forth in the original Answer and Counterclaim, 
but in order to avoid any uncertainty the additional claim was set 
forth in an Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim in the following 
language: 
"As a Third Defense, defendant, Jack C. Daniels, 
alleges as follows: 
"Prior to expiration of the statutory period for 
filing a mechanic's lien in this matter, Michael McCoy, 
in behalf of plaintiff's predecessors, to-wit, Michael 
McCoy, Kenneth Sitzberger, and Resort Consultants, Ltd., 
and/or Park Avenue Development, and/or 1039 Park Avenue 
Development, requested defendant not to file a 
mechanic's lien within the time permitted by law and 
stated to him that if he would refrain from filing, his 
claim would be paid within two weeks. Plantiff's said 
predecessors have failed to honor that representation 
and this defendant has been paid nothing and was 
required to file a lien, and by virtue of the aforesaid 
circumstances the period for filing mechanic's lien has 
been extended, and defendant's mechanic's lien has been 
timely filed under the circumstances of this case, or in 
the alternative the plaintiff and its predecessors are 
estopped to assert that said mechanic's lien was not 
timely filed." (R.84) 
In June, 1983, this court granted leave to Daniels to 
further amend his pleadings herein, particularly to join Deseret 
and certain other third-party defendants. An Amended Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint was thereafter filed 
adopting the Answer and Counterclaim and the aforesaid Amendment 
to Answer and Counterclaim (R.149-152) and seeking foreclosure of 
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his lien against Deseret and other parties asserting claims to the 
property. 
Two depositions of Daniels were taken in this case, the 
first on May 13, 1982, the relevant pages from which were incorpo-
rated with plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, which motion 
was denied (R.60-71). The second was taken September 30, 1983, 
and (in connection with the argument of Deseretfs Motion to 
Dismiss) was published by order of the Court on March 5, 1984. 
(R.244) Hereafter said depositions will be referred to as Daniels 
deposition 1 and Daniels deposition 2. 
Finally there is some additional testimony in the record 
from the deposition of Michael R. McCoy, an agent and officer of 
plaintiff, CEN Corporation, (and also a general partner in its 
predecessor in title) which appears in Daniels1 Memorandum in 
Opposition to Deseret's Motion to Dismiss (R.174), which will be 
cited hereinafter in some detail. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Daniels contends that the work performed by 
him on December 1, 1982, subsequent to the freezing of the pipes 
in the eight-plex, was a part of his original contract, was 
substantial, and was the type of work contemplated by our lien 
statute, Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, and accordingly 
December 1, 1981, was the day upon which the statutory 100-day 
period commenced to run, and therefore his mechanics lien filed 
February 3, 1982, was timely. At the very least it cannot be said 
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as a matter of law that there is no reasonable possibility that a 
fact finder could so find, and accordingly Daniels is entitled to 
a trial on the foregoing issues. 
Point II. Daniels was requested by the then-owner of 
the property not to timely file his mechanics lien and told that 
if he would so refrain, he would be paid within two weeks. That 
conduct of the then-owner, acting through his authorized agent, 
constitutes an estoppel, and Deseretf who acquired its interest in 
the property approximately one month after the Daniels mechanics 
lien was filed, takes subject to whatever rights Daniels is able 
to establish with regard to his mechanics lien. If Daniels is 
able to establish an estoppel against plaintiff pursuant to trial 
of that issue in the lower court, then Deseret will in like manner 
be estopped. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE WORK PERFORMED ON DECEMBER lf 1981, BY 
DANIELS WAS SUFFICIENT TO EXTEND HIS LIEN RIGHTS AS A MATTER OF 
LAW OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, RAISES A SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE OF FACT 
PRECLUDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
It is hornbook law that a summary judgment cannot be 
granted if any material issue of fact remains for determination by 
the finder of fact. 
In Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d 17, 492 P2d 980 (1972), 
this Court reiterated the rule of this Court with respect to 
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summary judgments in the following language (quoting from an 
earlier Utah case): 
"To sustain a summary judgment, the pleadings, 
evidence, admissions . . . must show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Such showing 
must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable 
possibility that the loser could win if given a trial." 
It is the contention of Daniels that the work done on 
December 1, 1981, was part of his original contract because he was 
told to go to the job site by plaintiff's predecessor, Michael 
McCoy, who claimed that the water damage was Daniels1 fault as he 
had not completed the job in accordance with his contract; that 
Daniels accordingly went to the job site, spent the day working 
there to determine the cause and extent of damage and.in making 
and obtaining costs estimates; that thereafter the aforesaid McCoy 
sued Daniels in the District Court of Salt Lake County, Case No. 
C-82-4628 (R.173, 181-184), claiming that Daniels had not done the 
work to plaintiff's satisfaction. It is Daniels' claim that 
plaintiff's predecessor, having prevailed upon him to go back to 
the job site and put in a days' work, claiming that Daniels had 
not properly completed the job, is estopped to deny that the work 
so performed is not a part of the original contract, and his 
successors in interest are likewise so estopped. 
We respectfully submit that it cannot be said as a 
matter of law there there is no reasonable "possibility" that a 
fact finder could find that Daniels returned to the job site by 
reason of the claim of plaintiff's predecessor that he had not 
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properly completed the job, and that while there he performed a 
day's labor by reason of those claims. 
Furthermore, the work done on December 1, 1981, was of 
the kind contemplated by our lien statute and was "substantial." 
On February 3, 1982, Daniels recorded a Notice of Lien 
in the Summit County Recorder's office claiming $80,253 owing to 
him as general contractor for construction of an eight-plex 
condominium in Park City. In pleadings in the lower court 
appellant asserted that the lien was timely filed because 
substantial work was done at the request of the owners on December 
1, 1981, (which would place the date of filing of the lien within 
the 100-day statutory period provided by Section 38-1-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended). 
Our lien statute, 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, provides 
as follows: 
"Contractors, subcontractors and all persons 
performing any services or furnishing any materials used 
in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in 
any mainner; all persons who shall do work or furnish 
materials for the prospecting, development, preservation 
or working of any mining claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas 
well, or deposit; and licensed architects and engineers 
and artisans who have furnished designs, plats, plans, 
maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, 
surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other 
like professional services, or bestowed labor, shall 
have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which 
they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished 
materials, for the value of the service rendered, labor 
performed or materials furnished by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other 
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor or 
otherwise. Such liens shall attach only to such 
interest as the owner may have in the property, but the 
-10-
interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or deposit, 
whether working under bond or otherwise, shall for the 
purposes of this chapter include products mined and 
excavated while the same remain upon the premises 
included within the lease." (Emphasis added.) 
All parties agree that the Court below held that: 
"On or about December 1 of that year [1982], several 
pipes at the condominium burst. The owners of the 
condominium contacted Daniels, and requested that he 
begin the necessary work to make adequate repairs. 
Daniels, as set out in his deposition of September 30, 
1983, [Daniels deposition 2] indicates that he contacted 
several subcontractors in anticipation of beginning 
work." Memorandum Decision, page 2 (R.234) 
The second Daniels deposition sets forth the fact that 
he went upon the premises, called Deseret to verify whether or not 
insurance would cover the broken water pipes, contacted other 
contractors, made estimates and lined up other subcontractors to 
go to work. The process took all of one day. (Daniels deposition 
2, pages 65 to 68, 73) 
Notwithstanding that the foregoing clearly makes an 
issue of fact, whether or not that day's work by Daniels extended 
the lien period, the trial court considered that day's work 
meaningless because in his opinion, "nor did the services add 
directly to the value of the property, the work done in December 
of '81 cannot extend the time period in which Daniels was to have 
filed his lien." (Memorandum Decision, R.238) The lower court did 
not seem to feel that the work on December 1, 1981, was not 
substantial, just that it was of the wrong kind. 
The trial court thus holds that estimates of costs 
(supposedly the exclusive basis by which architects may recover), 
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could not as a matter of law come within the phrase, "performing 
any services" (the words which introduce the whole statute). The 
Court held that such an act by a contractor could not be a basis 
for a lien. In making that assertion the Court cites no law and 
is going against the clear, unambiguous meaning of the statute 
itself. The trial court seems to be holding that contractors, 
subcontractors and other persons performing "any" services 
nevertheless cannot recover unless such services are equivalent to 
pounding nails or visually "improving" the property. This would 
lead to an unconscionable result and would seem to require all 
contractors, general and sub, to see to it that they took a 
"hammer" on the job and at some point pounded a nail in order to 
guarantee some sort of lien right. Proper construction of said 
Section 38-1-3 does not, we feel, compel nor permit the result 
that only architects, engineers and artisans may lien for 
estimates of costs, plans, maps and so on. We do not feel the 
legislature intended that contractors and subcontractors not be 
able to lien a project for "services" that would come in the 
category of estimates of cost, drawings, specifications, maps, 
plans, designs, etc. The process of estimating cost is one done 
equally as frequently by contractors and subcontrctors as by 
architects, engineers and artisans, and for that kind of service 
to be lienable for one class and not for the other would indeed 
make our lien statute constitutionally repugnant as special 
legislation. 
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In opposition to the trial court's reasoning is this 
Court's opinion in the case of Zions First National Bank v. 
Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395f 464 P2d 387 (1970). Speaking through 
Justice Callister the court held: 
"The trial court properly construed Section 38-1-3, 
UCA, 1953, insofar as it held that an architect may file 
a lien upon the property concerning which he has 
rendered professional service, although his plans may 
not be brought to fruition by erection of a building. 
However, the judgment of the district court may not be 
sustained, since under the facts and circumstances there 
is no basis to conclude that Design Securities 
Corporation impliedly authorized its lessee, Artcol, to 
engage an architect so as to bind the lessor's interest 
in respect to the service rendered." (Emphasis added.) 
The main opinion then goes on to consider the former 
architect's lien law that became consolidated with the lien of 
other claimants such as contractors, suppliers, etc., in the 1953 
codification. The prior architect's law indicated that the 
standard regarding the services relating to plans, designs, 
estimate's, etc., hinged on language such as "with respect to" or 
"concerning" the property and was not delimited to the requirement 
that some ground be broken or benefit bestowed. 
Nowhere in the whole of Section 38-1-3 is there a 
provision or any language requiring that an improvement or benefit 
must have been conferred upon land before liens can apply as the 
trial court herein has held. 
The related case of Calder Bros. Company vs. Anderson, 
652 P2d 922 (Utah, 1982), as well contains no "benefit conferred " 
requirement. The Court said: 
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"For contractor's lien to relate back to the 
commencement of work or supplying of materials by 
another contractor, however, both contractors1 projects 
must have been performed in connection with what is 
essentially a single project performed under a common 
plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness and without 
material abandonment, (cases cited) Ordinary 
maintenance or cleanup work does not serve as a basis 
for 'tacking' so as to fix an earlier lien date under 
38-1-5 for labor and materials supplied." (Emphasis 
added.) 
POINT II. A BENEFICIARY OF A TRUST DEED (MORTGAGEE) WHO 
ACQUIRES ITS INTEREST SUBSEQUENT TO RECORDING OF NOTICE OF LIEN 
TAKES SUBJECT TO WHATEVER RIGHTS CONTRACTOR IS ABLE TO ESTABLISH 
THEREUNDER, AND IF TRUSTOR OF TRUST DEED (MORTGAGOR) IS ESTOPPED 
TO ASSERT LATE FILING OF MECHANICS LIEN AS A DEFENSE THERETO, THEN 
SUCH BENEFICIARY (MORTGATEE) IS LIKEWISE ESTOPPED. 
In his Amendment to Answer and Counterclaim Daniels 
asserted: 
"As a Third Defense, defendant, Jack C. Daniels, 
alleges as follows: 
"Prior to expiration of the statutory period 
for filing a mechanic's lien in this matter, Michael 
McCoy, in behalf of plaintiff's predecessors, to-wit, 
Michael McCoy, Kenneth Sitzberger, and Resort 
Consultants, Ltd., and/or Park Avenue Development, 
and/or 1039 Park Avenue Development, requested defendant 
not to file a mechanic's lien within the time permitted 
by law and stated to him that if he would refrain from 
filing, his claim would be paid within two weeks. 
Plantiff's said predecessors have failed to honor that 
representation and this defendant has been paid nothing 
and was required to file a lien, and by virtue of the 
aforesaid circumstances the period for filing mechanic's 
lien has been extended, and defendant's mechanic's lien 
has been timely filed under the circumstances of this 
case, or in the alternative the plaintiff and its 
predecessors are estopped to assert that said mechanic's 
lien was not timely filed." (R.84) 
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For purposes of summary judgment the allegations of 
Daniels' pleadings must be taken as true. In this case, however, 
there was ample corroboratory evidence, both from Daniels and 
Michael McCoy, agent for plaintiff, to demonstrate the truth of 
that pleading. Pages 24 through 29 of the first Daniels 
deposition (R.64-68) set out the essentials of the pleadings cited 
above. It was repeated again in Daniels1 Answers to 
Interrogatories as follows: 
"I had a conversation with Mr. McCoy over the telephone, 
as indicated in my deposition, the substance of which 
was that Mr. McCoy requested that I not take any action 
to enforce my mechanics lien rights, in return for which 
he would see that I got paid. In reliance thereon, I 
did not enforce my mechanics lien rights at that time, 
but Mr. McCoy has refused to keep his commitment. For 
further details of this and other conversations, see my 
deposition heretofore taken in this matter." (R.136) 
That position is buttressed by the testimony of Michael 
R. McCoy, agent of plaintiff and owner: 
"A. And I basically told Mr. Daniels that if the 
permanent financing was not put in place, or the 
project wasn't sold and the building went into 
default, everybody would lose everything and my 
investors would probably lose a quarter of a million 
dollars or more. 
"Q. Did you ever say anything to Mr. Daniels asking him 
to delay taking action on its building by way of 
lien or other effort to try to collect this claim? 
"A. I basically told Mr. Daniels not to make waves with 
the bank, is the tone of my conversation." (R.174) 
Thus, in the lower court Daniels raised in his pleadings 
an issue of estoppel as against plaintiff from asserting late 
filing of his mechanics lien. Plaintiff denied those issues, and 
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inasmuch as they involved questions of fact no determination has 
yet been made of those issues since this matter has never been 
tried. 
Deseret argued that even though plaintiff might be 
estopped to assert late filing of the mechanics lien, that would 
nevertheless not constitute an estoppel against Deseret because 
Deseret had not been a party to the conduct giving rise to the 
estoppel. The trial court apparently adopted that argument as the 
Court stated in its Memorandum Decision at page 238 of the record 
as follows: 
"'In support of this proposition, Daniels cites the 
case of Beltline Brick Co. vs. Standard Home Building, 
213 N.W. 41 Minnesota, 1927. This seems to be contrary 
to Utah law. See Smith v. Oregon Shortline Railroad 
Co., 30 Utah 246, 84 P 108 (1906), and Utah Savings & 
Loan Association v. Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P2d 598 
(1961). The court in Smith v. Oregon Shortline, stated 
that in order to establish an estoppel against a mort-
gagee, the lien claimant must establish certain facts. 
He must establish concealment, misrepresentation, an act 
or declaration by the mortgagee. There is no evidence 
to indicate that any of these events occurred. If the 
law were to the contrary, it would allow owners and 
individual mechanic lien claimants to determine the 
priority of other lien claimants, whether they were 
other mechanics lien claimants, or holders of trust 
deeds and mortgages. This could create confusion in the 
law, which would be intolerable." (Emphasis added.) 
It is therefore apparent that the Court did not purport 
to rule on whether or not Daniels could assert a valid claim of 
estoppel against plaintiff, and indeed could not make a ruling on 
that point. The lower court has in effect ruled that a subsequent 
mortgagee, even though it takes with notice from a mortgagor who 
is estopped to assert a statute of limitations as to the filing of 
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a lien by reason of its conduct nevertheless takes free and clear 
of such estoppel unless a subsequent mortgagee somehow 
participated in the conduct giving rise to the estoppel. 
We believe the lower court to be in error in this 
ruling. 
As to whether or not Deseret was aware of the 
transaction we wish to point out that Section 57-3-2, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) as amended, provides as follows: 
"Every conveyance, or intrument in writing 
affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, 
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, 
and every patent to lands within this state duly 
executed and verified according to law, and every 
judgment, order or decree of any court of record in this 
state, or a copy thereof, required by law to be recorded 
in the office of the county recorder, and every 
financing statement which complies with the provisions 
of section 70A-9-402 shall, from the time of filing the 
same with the recorder for record, impart notice to all 
persons of the contents thereof; and subsequent 
purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed 
to purchase and take with notice." (Emphasis added.) 
By reason of the foregoing, Deseret, having entered into 
a loan transaction with the owner of the property on February 22, 
1982, is a "subsequent mortgagee" within the meaning of the 
aforesaid statute and therefore "shall be deemed to purchase and 
take with notice" of the claim of Daniels recorded almost one 
month prior. 
It is thus clear that third-party defendant, Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan, when it recorded its Trust Deed one month 
after appellant's Notice of Lien was filed, took subject to 
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whatever appellant can prove with regard to his lien. The lower 
court in its Memorandum Decision at page 6 stated that in order 
for appellant to establish an estoppel that would be binding 
against Deseret, appellant had to prove that Deseret was somehow 
responsible for the estoppel. As noted, the Court stated that 
appellant "must establish concealment, misrepresentation, an act 
or declaration by the mortgagee. There is no evidence to indicate 
that any of these events occurred." See Memorandum Decision 
(R.238). There is of course no evidence to indicate that Deseret 
committed the estoppel. Appellant is only asserting that the 
predecessor in interest of Deseret committed the acts giving rise 
to the estoppel, and Deseret, having full notice of the lien, 
takes subject to whatever appellant is able to establish for that 
lien. We respectfully submit that that is axiomatic in this 
state. 
The Court further stated starting on page 6 of the 
Court's Memorandum Decision: (R.238-9) 
"If the law were to the contrary it would allow 
owners and individual mechanic lien claimants to 
determine the priority of other lien claimants, whether 
they were other mechanic lien claimants, or holders of 
trust deeds and mortgages. This would create confusion 
in the law, which would be intolerable." 
The foregoing statement by the Court is totally meaning-
less so far as we have been able to determine, and if anything is 
going to create an intolerable situation, it is to allow a 
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee to take free and clear of the 
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claims of prior recorded liens. That will totally nullify the 
recording act and really bring confusion into the law. 
Under the foregoing circumstances Deseretfs rights in 
and to the property are subject to any right which Daniels is able 
to establish pursuant to said Notice of Lien. Deseret, having 
loaned against the property and knowing of the claim of Daniels, 
takes subject to whatever consequences may flow in law from the 
facts of which the record gives notice. 
In support of appellant's position we cite the case of 
Ochoa v. Hernandez Y. Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 57 L.Ed. 1427, 33 
S.Ct. 1033, which stands for the proposition that a subsequent 
lienholder takes subject to whatever consquences may flow in law 
from the facts of which the record gives notice. 
If Daniels is able to establish the validity of his 
lien, it is binding upon all persons taking with notice thereof. 
In addition Deseret is on notice of any and all matters which the 
recorded instrument suggests to a person of ordinary prudence of 
the need to make further inquiry. That of course is a matter of 
reasonableness and good faith and is at the very least an issue of 
fact upon which the court could not rule on a motion to dismiss. 
Although discovery was never completed with respect to 
the Third-Party Complaint, it seems certain that Deseret would not 
refinance the property (as it did) without a title report. 
Further, a rather frantic and unorthodox campaign was launched to 
have the Court nullify the lien and substitute in its place a 
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personal and unsecured bond of McCoy and his associatef Doms 
(R.9). Judge Dee actually granted their request ex parte (R.13), 
but the request was denied by Judge Baldwin after hearing (R.138). 
No doubt this effort was to enable Deseret to acquire its interest 
without being subordinate to the mechanics lien. When that 
approach failed, the mechanics lien was no doubt insured around. 
It thus appears certain that Deseret also had actual notice. 
Whatever interest Deseret may have in the property in 
question it has derived from the owner of the property, to-wit, 
plaintiff. Furthermore, it entered into a loan transaction 
whereby plaintiff owes Deseret certain sums pursuant to promissory 
notes. It must therefore be evident to everyone that Deseret and 
plaintiff have established a relationship of privity of contract, 
and furthermore it must be obvious that they have established a 
relationship of privity of estate. Privity of estate exists in 
those circumstances where a mutual or successive interest exists 
in the same property. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., defines 
privity: 
"Mutual or successive relationship to the same 
rights of property. 1 Greenl.Ev. § 189; Duffy v. Blake, 
91 Wash. 140, 157 P. 480, 482; Haverhill v. Inter-
national Ry. Co., 217 App.Div. 521, 217 N.Y.S. 522, 
523." 
Whatever interest Deseret may have by virtue of its 
trust deeds at one time belonged to plaintiff as plaintiff is the 
entity who granted those rights to Deseret. It must therefore be 
conceded that Deseret has succeeded to those rights from plaintiff 
-20-
and no one else. The trust deed states in part that plaintiff 
"irrevocably grants and conveys to trustee, in trust, with power 
of sale, the following described property located in the county of 
Summit, State of Utah." It should be noted that in the trust deed 
Deseret is both trustee and beneficiary. Deseret is clearly in 
privity of contract and estate with plaintiff. 
Elwell v. New England Mortgage Security Co., 28 SE 833 
(1847), is a case where the owner of a certain tract gave a deed 
by way of security (in other words, as a mortgage) to New England 
Mortgage. Thereafter a suit was commenced against the owner and a 
judgment of ejectment obtained by a third party. 
That action involved a determination of rights of the 
judgment creditor against New England, the holder of the security 
interest. The court stated: 
"This reasoning applies with equal force to the 
present case, where the deed was given to secure a debt; 
and we think, therefore, that, the deed having been made 
before the commencement of the action in ejectment 
against the grantor, the grantee is not concluded or 
estopped by the judgment. He is privy in estatee only 
with respect to the estate at the time of the execution 
of the security deed, or to what is the legitimate 
result of its status at that time." (Emphasis added.) 
Applying that to this case, although Deseret may not be 
in privity with plaintiff as to actions of plaintiff taken after 
February 22, 1982, (or perhaps even March 1, 1982), Deseret is in 
privity with plaintiff as to the state of its title on February 
22, 1982, when it received its trust deeds. The title of 
plaintiff was on that date encumbered with the mechanics lien of 
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Daniels, and Deseret takes subject to whatever the court holds in 
this action, as between plaintiff and Daniels on the matter of the 
validity of the mechanic's lien, a matter yet to be tried. 
There is no question that the estoppel transaction 
resulted in a benefit to the owner of the property because the 
owner specifically requested that the lien not be filed, and it 
was not filed. The owner apparently did not wish to have a 
mechanics lien against the property, apparently because it was 
negotiating for more money and did not desire to have that process 
disturbed. It is of course not necessary that an actual contract 
with consideration be proved to establish an estoppel. All that 
is necessary is that a representation be made with the intent that 
it be relied uponf which is certainly a circumstance set forth in 
Daniels' pleadings. 
The case of Beltline Brick Company v. Standard Home 
Building Company, 213 NW 41 (Minn. 1927) is on all fours with the 
instant case although labeled without justification by the lower 
court as an "aberration." 
In the Beltline case the plaintiff furnished brick for 
the construction of a building owned by defendant's predecessor in 
title. The defense was that the plaintiff had not filed a lien 
statement within the 90 days required by the local statute. The 
court stated in that case: 
"The court found that there was an implied 
agreement between the parties, arising out of such 
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transaction, to extend the time for filing a lien 
statement, that the building company is, by its conduct 
estopped to assert or contend that such brick was not 
furnished for use upon the premises or that the lien 
statement was filed too late, and that the defendant, 
Ella T. Robitschek, is a grantee after the filing of 
said lien statement, is also subject to such estoppel. 
Upon these matters the evidence amply sustains the 
findings and the findings support the conclusion." 
If Beltline is an "aberration," then so too is Smith vs. 
Oregon Shortline Railroad Co., 30 Ut 246, 84 P 108 (1906), a case 
which involved a dispute regarding a section of railroad road bed. 
The facts in Smith were that some 30 years prior to the action the 
appellant railroad company's predecessor (also a railroad company) 
came upon the land of the respondent's predecessor, simply took 
the land, laid its tracks out upon it, and used the same for 25 
years—all without objection from the then-landowner, respondent's 
predecessor. Approximately 25 years later the appellant railroad 
company came upon the premises and enlarged the roadbed, and in so 
doing, took an additional strip on each side of approximately 4 
and 8 feet respectively—again without objection by the then-
landowner, respondent's predecessor. Thereafter respondent 
acquired the property and brought suit, not only to reacquire the 
said strips which had been taken most recently, but to acquire the 
entire roadbed which had been taken some 30 years before. The 
court allowed the respondent to recover back the strips taken 
several years prior, but ruled against the respondent as to the 
roadbed taken approximately 30 years before. The court stated: 
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"As to this portion of the tract the findings show 
that it was entered upon 30 years ago, permanent and 
valuable improvements were made thereon, and it was, 
during all that time, continuously and exclusively 
occupied by the appellant and its predecessors for 
railroad purposes without objection or interruption. From 
these facts, a license to occupy may well be implied, and, 
at the time of the conveyance, respondent's grantor would 
be estopped from ejecting the appellant. . . . Of course, 
if respondent's grantor at the time of his conveyance was 
estopped from maintaining an action of ejectment for the 
additional strips taken, then likewise is the respondent 
estopped from maintaining such action." (Emphasis added.) 
From the foregoing it is clear where the respondent's 
predecessor was estopped, the subsequent owner was likewise 
estopped. As plaintiff is estopped, so too is Deseret. We 
believe Beltline and Smith state the law, and are not 
"aberrations." 
Finally, we desire to point out (although the lower 
court has not ruled otherwise, and presumably will not) that Rice 
v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P2d 159, stands for 
the proposition that a Statute of Limitation can be waived by oral 
statements and conduct, and we believe the same rule applies to 
the time prescribed for filing a mechanics lien. In Rice the 
plaintiff was damaged or injured by the negligence of an employee 
of the defendant school district was repeatedly assured by the 
insurance adjuster that she would be compensated for her damages 
as soon as they were ascertained and was therefore led beyond the 
statutory filing period under the Governmental Immunity Act of the 
State of Utah before she in fact filed her action. The school 
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board then raised the limitations aspect of the Act as a defense. 
The Utah Supreme Court, speaking on that issue, said: 
"Even if the one-year limitation of Section 63-30-
15 be deemed mandatory, this court has previously held: 
. . . Waiver or estoppel may be found in the face of a 
mandatory statute. For instance, statutes of limitation 
ordinarily are mandatory both in form and effect. 
Nevertheless, they may be waived or the party may be 
estopped from relying upon them." (The court then by 
footnote cites several Utah cases.) 
The court then continues: 
"Hence the filing of the claim within ninety days, 
while mandatory upon the claimant and a condition 
precedent to his cause of action, is nothing more than a 
procedural requirement as to the agency, which, as to 
the claimant may be excused by estoppel. 
"In Benner v. Industrial Ace. Comm., supra, 26 Cal 
2d 346, 349, 159 P2d 24, 26, the court said, fWhere, as 
here, the delay in commencing action was induced by the 
conduct of the party sought to be charged the latter may 
not invoke such conduct to defeat recovery. An estoppel 
may arise although there was no designed fraud on the 
part of the person sought to be estopped. To create an 
equitable estoppel, 'it is enough if the party has been 
induced to refrain from using such means or taking such 
action as lay in his power, by which he might have 
retrieved his position and saved himself from loss1 
. . .
 f
 It is well-settled that a person by his conduct 
may be estopped to rely upon these defenses. Where the 
delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of 
the defendant, it cannot be availed of by him as a 
defense.1" (The court then by footnote alludes to a 
series of California cases supporting that view.) 
(Emphasis in original.) 
The court then concludes: 
"The trial court erred by an entry of summary 
judgment in behalf of the defendant. This case is 
reversed and remanded for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion." 
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CONCLUSION 
We therefore respectfully submit that the lower court 
erred in granting Deseret's Motion to Dismiss. We respectfully 
submit that the pleadingsf depositions and the documents on file 
in this action at the very least raise a substantial issue of fact 
as to whether the work performed by Daniels on December lr 1986, 
was substantial and part of the original contract by reason of the 
claim of the plaintiff that defendant had not properly completed 
the contract. 
Furthermore, we believe that the work performed was of 
the kind contemplated by Section 38-1-3. 
We further respectfully submit that the trial court 
erred in ruling that even though plaintiff might be estopped 
through its conduct from asserting the defense of late filing of 
the mechanics lien, that Deseret was nevertheless not estopped 
unless it participated in such conduct, such being clearly against 
the weight of authority in this state and generally. 
For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully request that 
the Summary Judgment of the lower court be reversed and the matter 
be remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted: 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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NOTICE OF LIEN \:uj; 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: / 
Z 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned. toJjk„_(Li_JLajlifJ^..--..J_.iL-Cj3Ln^.trjuLC.tion 
doing business as.. General Contractor _and residing at 
..State of Utah, hereby claim— _Jlfe^±.jJj^olan County of £al_t-.Lflj£j_ 
and intend.... to hold and claim a lien upon that certain land and premises, owned and reputed to be 
owned b y . 2 2 L u ^ O ^ and 
situate, lying and being in 2axk.ili.ty: , County of. -Summit 
State of Utah, described as follows, to wit: 
1039 Park Avenue, flight Unit Condominium Park C i t y , Utah 
Lots 8 . 9 . 10. 13 . ? 4 . ?5 and the Southern o n e - h a l f ( l / 2 ) 
of l o t s 11 and ? ? , Block 4 , Park City Survey, according t o 
1 - t h e r e g i o n fJJjt_J-M, 




f>V. i€C\ St»»-%I1T CO. RECORDER 
rAKTRACl ^ " ™ V * 
-&3.SU25Z+Q£L to secure the payment of the sum of 





in, on and about the_ December l f 1981 _on said land. 
That the said indebtedness accrued and the undersigned furnished said materials to (or was em-
(ErmM according to ihm fact) 
Jack C. Danie l s - J D Construct ion ployed by) 
_who was the 
Contractor 
owner and the reputed owner of said premises as 
aforesaid, under a-Bu.il.ding contract made between the said Development 
Company and the undersigned 
on the. 8th__.day of—August. , 19 3.0, by the terms of which the undersigned did agree 
to c o n s t r u c t e i g h t u n i t condominium 
and the said. 
did agree to pay the undersigned therefor as follows, to wit:__.Si.xtX-.d.aX3..^f±fi.E...tili-S 
.Co a i r ar t was f n 1 f.ilLe_d 
and under which said contract the under-
signed did......f.urn i.sh the first J.ab_o_r..&„m„ater_iaJLs_.on the 2_£.tb day of 
_Augus-t-L9.8J2.and did fjirni sh -the last„ -XaWr-. on the 
~L?A ...day of tiec.embe.r.„i..9.8.1. _ _ and on and between said last mentioned 
. amounting 
Dollars, 
furn i sh labor days, did 
to the sum of l?-9.».15_l:„9-9.-
which was the reasonable value thereof, and on which the following payments have been made to wit: 
NONE 
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of—...&8D.+.2.5J2L.Q.Q . 
- _ Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which 
demand the undersigned hold.... and claim... a lien by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, of Title 
38, of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
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JACK C. DANIELS, et al., 
Defendants. 
JACK C. DANIELS, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs . 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Third Party Defendants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 6790 
This action was brought by the plaintiff to determine among 
other things, the validity of a lien filed by defendant Daniels 
on February 3, 1982. Daniels then brought a third party action 
against third party defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan 
Association. 
The undisputed facts are that Daniels is a contractor who 
performed certain services, and furnished labor and materials used 
in the construction of a building on the real property in 'question. 
The project was a condominium located in Summit County, Utah. 
• # 
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
DANIELS, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The deposition of Jack Daniels indicates that by the end of July, 
1981 all construction pursuant to the Building Contract Agreement 
had been completed. Certificates of Final Inspection and Occupancy 
were issued by the City of Park City, Utah. 
On or about December 1st of that year, several pipes in the 
condominium burst. The owners of the condominium contacted Daniels, 
and requested that he begin the necessary work to make adequate 
repairs. Daniels, as set out in h'is deposition of September 30, 
1983, indicates that he contacted several subcontractors in 
anticipation of beginning work. Prior to any work being done on 
the project by any contractors or subcontractors, the owners 
advised him that he did not need to make the repairs for reasons 
best known to themselves. 
As indicated above, Daniels filed his mechanic's lien 
on February 3, 1982, and shortly thereafter Deseret Federal filed 
its Trust Deed. 
Daniels also claims that the time in which he could file his 
mechanic1s lien was extended by virtue of an agreement he had 
with the owners. 
Deseret Federal now moves to dismiss claiming that Daniels1 
mechanic's lien was not timely filed. 
Daniels counters by saying that the last work done on the 
project was done in December of 1981, and further he was given an 
extension of time by the owners in which to file his lien. 
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
DANIELS, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
A careful review of the facts shows that the project was 
completed in July of 1981, and that the work the owners wanted done 
in December of 1981 was not a continuation of the earlier project, 
but merely repairs. If repairs to a completed project could be 
construed as extending the time in which a mechanic!s lien could 
be filed, mechanic's liens could be filed many years after a 
project had been completed. Therefore, the lien in question could 
relate back only to the amount of 'work done during December of 1981. 
Deseret Federal, however, claims that the lien is invalid 
since no work was actually done by Daniels on the project. It 
is undisputed that no improvements were made to the project, and 
that Daniels' only involvement was to contact various subcontractors 
and craftsmen. 
A close reading of Section 38-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, indicates that there are three distinct categories of 
persons who are entitled to file a lien in situations of this type. 
Addressing them in reverse order, these persons are licensed 
architects, engineers and artisans who furnish designs, plats, 
plans and estimates of costs. The next category are those persons 
involved in mining, and the location and/or working of oil and gas 
deposits. The last category, which is mentioned first in the 
statute, is the category of contractors, subcontractors and 
all other persons. In this Court's opinion, Daniels falls in 
the contractors category. The only other category he could possibly 
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
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fall into would be on the basis that he provided an estimate of 
costs. Construing the deposition of Mr. Daniels in his favor, the 
Court must conclude that he was not hired to furnish an estimate of 
costs, but rather to make repairs. This Court believes that the 
correct interpretation of the statute is that to fall within the 
third category in the statute in question, a person must be one 
hired specifically to estimate costs. To rule otherwise would 
mean that a contractor who takes on a job on a cost-plus basis, 
and without telling the owner what the cost of the project would be, 
would be in one category, whereas the contractor who gave a bid 
would fall in another category in the event both were to file a lien 
for the work they performed in contacting subcontractors. To 
reach such a result would seem to be nonsensical and absurd. 
For this reason, this Court believes that the only conclusion that 
can be reached is that Mr. Daniels falls within the first category 
mentioned in the statute. 
The second and third categories differ from the first category 
in one notable way. That is the requirement placed upon those 
falling within the first category that the services, materials or 
equipment must be "used in the construction, alteration or 
improvement of any building or structure or improvement." This 
requirement is not typical to the second two categories. 
There is a brief statement of the legislative history of 
the predecessor of the statute in question contained in Zions First 
^oO 
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National Bank vs. Carlson, 23 Utah 2d 395, 464 P.2d 387 (1970). 
Based upon this legislative history, it would appear that the 
distinction between the first category and the second and third 
categories is that on many occasions engineers and architects do 
a substantial amount of work which does not per se improve the 
property, and further is not visible upon an inspection of the 
property. An architect and engineer may work many months in 
preparing plans, preparing renderings, and making computations. 
In fact, the bulk of the work done by an architect and engineer, 
with the exception of supervision, is done off the property site. 
This likewise holds true for work done on mining claims for oil 
and gas deposits. A geologist may spend many hours reviewing 
maps and locate prior deposits in a neighboring region, and yet 
never visit the site. For these reasons, this Court is of the 
opinion that the distinction between the first category and the 
second and third categories is a valid one, which takes into account 
the problems of those persons involved in the construction and 
design of real estate projects, as well as the development of 
mining and fossil fuel deposits. 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court is of the 
opinion that Zions First National Bank vs. Carlson, supra, does 
not apply to the facts here. In Zions First National Bank, the 
lien claimant involved fell into the third category rather than 
the first. It is for this reason that the Court stated that the 
CEN CORPORATION VS. 
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plans for the erection of a building need not be used in the 
erection of the building; 
It appears to this Court that since the activities of Daniels 
in December of 1981 are not services used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of the building, nor did the services 
add directly to the value of the property, the work done in 
December of 1981 cannot extend the time period in which Daniels was 
to have filed his lien. See, Cald'er Brothers vs. Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982) . 
Daniels also makes the claim that if the lien was not timely 
filed, Deseret Federal is estopped from making that claim since 
Daniels had an agreement with the owners which allowed for the 
late filing of a lien. In support of this proposition, Daniels 
cites the case of Beltline Brick Company vs. Standard Home Building, 
213 N.W. 41 (Minn. 1927). This seems to be contrary to Utah law. 
See, Smith vs. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 30 Utah 246, 
84 P. 108 (1906), and Utah Savings and Loan Association vs. Mecham 
12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598 (1961). The court in Smith vs. Oregon, 
Short Line, stated that in order to establish an estoppel against 
a mortgagee, the lien claimant must establish certain facts. He 
must establish concealment, misrepresentation, an act or 
declaration by the mortgagee. There is no evidence to indicate 
that any of these events occurred. If the law were to the contrary, 
it would allow owners and individual mechanic lien claimants to 
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determine the priority of other lien claimants, whether they were 
other mechanic lien claimants, or holders of trust deeds and 
mortgages. This would create confusion in the law, which would be 
intolerable. 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the lien 
of Daniels is null and void as to Deseret Federal. Deseret 
Federal's Motion is granted. Counsel for Deseret Federal is 
directed to prepare an Order in agcordance with this Decision, and 
have the Order either approved as to form, or he should adhere 
to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice of the District Court. 
Dated this b day of April, 1984. 
;HLI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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JACK C. DANIELS, et al., 
Defendants, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JACK C. DANIELS, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, Civil No. 6790 
-v-
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
M0KTMGE270 O A Z 
The motion of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal 
Savings & Loan Association came on regularly for hearing 
before this Court on March 5, 1984, the Honorable Philip R. 
Fishier, District Judge, presiding, George A. Hunt of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau and A. Dean Jeffs of Jeffs & Jeffs 
appearing for Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association and Gordon A. Madsen of Madsen & Cummings 
appearing for Third-Party Plaintiff Jack Daniels, and the 
Court having heard argument of counsel and having reviewed 
the memoranda on file with the Court and having requested 
supplemental memoranda from counsel and the same having been 
filed, and the deposition of Defendant and Third-Party Plain-
tiff Jack C. Daniels having been published and the Court being 
fully advised in the premises and having rendered its Memorandum 
Decision in the matter on April 6, 1984, granting the motion 
of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion 
to Dismiss of Third-Party Defendant Deseret Federal Savings & 
Loan Association be and the same hereby is granted and judgment 
is rendered in its favor and against Third-Party Plaintiff Jack 
C. Daniels, no cause of action. 
DATED this %/4 £- day of April, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
• '1 ^~> S~\ 
JUJ&NPJLJ . 
v Phi l ip ' R. F i sh i e r , D i s t r i c t Lp R. F i sh i e r , D i s t r i c t Judge 
aSffitTEftGE271 "2" I 
•J> A 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kay I. Brown, being duly sworn, deposes and states: 
that she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Deseret Federal Savings 
& Loan Association herein; that she served the attached 
Summary Judgment, Summit County District Court, Civil No. 
6790 upon the following by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Gordon Madsen, Esq. 
320 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Roger H. Bullock, Esq. 
6th Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Melvin G. Larew, Jr., Esq. 
6914 South 3000 East, #205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
James M. Dean, Esq. 
61 South Main, #403 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey Brown, Esq. 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Carmen E. Kipp, Esq. 
Karen J. McClurg 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq. 
Suite 1000, 10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and mailing the same, postage pre-paid on the 11th day of April, 
1984. 
yArwv^ 
Subscribed and sworn to bef027^ me this 11th day of April, 
1984. ^ 
i/A^. 
NOTARYZ>UBLIC, r e s i d i n g a t : 
WJA^S fe^ , 
